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to ,have lost something of that nice and critical self-respect, which
proves so indispensable in maintaining a high degree of honor
and decorum iI any profession or pursuit. And we greatly fear
that in combining both orders of the profession in this country,
we shall be more in danger of pulling them all down to the lower
level than likely to bring them all up to the higher plane of
professional honor and purity. There are, no doubt, in the
English bar, a very large proportion of members, who have
almost no occupation, buit who live in chambers at the different
inns of court, and subsist in a very small way, upon a narrow
income, inherit6d perhaps; and whom you will never see in court
or in society; but who are nevertheless pure-minded, clean-
handed men; not a whit inferior in point of character to the ablest
men in Westminster Hall or Lincoln's Inn. We have no such
men, and never can have, whose very presence is a rebuke to
vice, and a defence from crime. Many of our hangers-on, upon
the contrary, are a dead weight to drag us downwards. And by
hangers-on we mean to embrace many who are nominally in the.
bar, but have gone into other and more hopeful pursuits on the
score of emolument or promotion, and among the number many
who have gone into political life, and who subsist upon robbery
of one kind or another. From none of our number do we receive
more fatal wounds. I.F.R.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme Court of -Errors of Connecticut.
EDWARD S. ROBERTS'v. WILBUR HALL.
A. held the promissory note of the defendant, obtained of him by fraud, and
which the defendant had demanded back immediately on discovering the fraud.
The note was payable to A.'s order and on time, and before due A. endorsed it to
the plaintiff in trust in part for certain creditors and the balance for A.'s wife, the
plaintiff having no knowledge of the infirmity of the note. The creditors accepted
the transfer and directed the plaintiff to bring suit on the note when due. Held, 1.
That so far as the trust for A.'s wife was concerned, the plaintiff took the note as
agent of A., and therefore with its infirmity. 2. That the entire transaction by
which the note was transferred to the plaintiff was out of the regular course of
business, and that the note therefore remained open to the defence of fraud.
The wife of A. was living apart from him, but was not divorced. Held not to
aff:ct the case.
The taking of negotiable paper as payment of or security for a pre-existing
debt is not out of the regular course of business.
ROBERTS v. HALL.
The question whether negotiable paper was taken in the regular course of busi-
ness resolves itself into the inquiry whether mercantile paper is ordinarily used in
the manner in which the paper in question was used, and whether a business man
would ordinarily have received the paper, in the circumstances in which it was
offered, and parted with his property for it.
THE note in suit was one of two notes, given for the purchase-
money f certain property sold to the defendant by one Yale.
The defendant was induced by fraud to give his notes for $700
for property which was worth but $400. The day after the sale
the fraud was discovered by the defendant, who thereupon offered
to return the property to Yale, and demanded a return of his
notes; but Yale refused to accept the property and return the
notes. The other note and $79 of this note were paid to Yale
from the avails of certain collaterals, which payment exceeded
the value of the property. This note, before due, was transferred
to the plaintiff, in trust for the payment of certain creditors
named, with a balance payable to the wife of Yale, who was then
living apart from her husband, and who had since been divorced.
The creditors assented to the trust, and directed the plaintiff to
commence and prosecute this suit. The note was more than suf-
ficient to pay the creditors named, so that, if collected, there
would be a balance to be paid to the wife. The plaintiff had no
knowledge of the fraud, and took the note in good faith for* the
purposes aforesaid. There was no consideration for the transfer,
except the claims of the creditors. Whether the payee was or
was not, at the time of the transfer of the note, insolvent, did not
appear.
Oc. . Woodruff . Hitchcock, for plaintiff in error.
E. W. Seymour, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARPENTER, J.-The Superior Court rendered judgment for
the plaintiff. The court, therefore, must have decided that the
plaintiff took the note in good faith, for a valuable consideration,
and in the regular course of business. The case presents two
questions :
1. Is the plaintiff to be regarded as the trustee for the credit-
ors, or the agent of the payee? If the latter, it is conceded that
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover; if the former, then the
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plaintiff insists upon his right to recover, and the defendant
denies it. We think the plaintiff, to a certain extent, is a trustee
for the creditors. The auditor has clearly found that the note
was transferred to the plaintiff in trust for the creditors and Mrs.
Yale, and that the creditors ratified and confirmed said transfer,
and that the plaintiff is following their directions in bringing and
prosecuting this action. In respect, however, to that portion of
the note which was payable to Mrs. Yale, we are clearly of the
opinion that he was the agent of the payee, and was in no sense
a trustee for creditors. The ordinary relations between husband
and wife will be presumed to have existed in this case until the
contrary appears. It is only found that they were living apart,
and have since been divorced. No indebtedness from him to her
is found; and, so far as appears, the money, as soon as paid to
her, would have been subject to his control.
The legal effect of the transaction then, so far as it relates to
this question, is the same that it would have been if the balance
had been payable to him. To the extent of that balance, there-
fore, the judgment is clearly erroneous, and it must be reversed.
2. Was this note taken in the regular course of business? In
the discussion of this question we shall not controvert the legal
proposition that a negotiable note, transferred before due in the
regular course of business to a creditor, in payment of, or as
security for, a pre-existing debt, is taken in good faith and for a
valuable consideration, and is collectable in the hands of the
creditor, notwithstanding any equities existing as between the
original parties thereto. That question has been correctly settled
in this state and elsewhere, and we have no disposition to disturb
it: Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 888; Bridgeport City Bank v.
Welch, 29 Id. 479.
Nor do we place our decision upon the ground that this note
was obtained by fraud. We suppose the general rule to be, that
fraud is not available as a defence in cases of this character. To
this rule, however, there are exceptions: F0oster v. Mackinnon, 4
Law Rep. 0. P. 704; .Nance v. Lary, 5 Ala. 370.
But it is not material to our present purpose to inquire whether
this case falls within those exceptions. Our object is rather to
consider whether the rule of law which exempts commercial
paper from legal defences, applies to a case like this. We think
it is pertinent to that inquiry to call attention to the fact, that
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this note was obtained by fraud; that the contract was not only
voidable, but was actually avoided by the maker immediately
upon discovering the fraud. We need not say that it is the duty
of the court to protect the maker and prevent the consummation
of the fraud, if it can be done consistently with the rules of law.
The only difficulty that we can perceive is in preserving unim-
paired the rule of law giving immunity to negotiable paper, and
the principles upon which it rests. That rule does not protect
paper which was not taken in the usual course of business. That
phrase, as Mr. Parsons, in his work on Notes and Bills, vol. 1,
p. 256, justly remarks, "1 is open to some objections, for the reason
that it does not clearly indicate what are the legitimate uses of
negotiable paper. The question is variously expressed in the
books: 11 Was it in the course of trade ?" "XWas it in the ordi-
nary and regular course of business ?" "1 Was it a transaction
which the law views as according to the usage of merchants ?"
A more definite idea of its meaning may be had, however, by
stating the question more specifically. Is negotiable paper ordi-
narily used in the way and manner this was used? Would a
business man, of ordinary intelligence and capacity, receive com-
mercial paper, when offered for the purposes for which this was
transferred, as money, and upon its credit part with his property ?
Or would he at once suspect the integrity of the paper itself, and
the credit and standing of the party offering it ? A correct
answer to these questions must settle conclusively the mercantile
character of this transaction.
The fundamental principle of the law, applicable to negotiable
paper, is that it is the representative of money, and may be used
in all mercantile transactions as its substitute. But when used
for any purpose outside the usual and ordinary course of business,
it ceases to carry with it the privileges and immunities with which
the law clothes negotiable paper. The tendency of the law in
respect to the legitimate uses of negotiable paper is thus referred
to in 1 Pars. on Notes and Bills 257': "And therefore we are
disposed to believe that the law of this country is tending towards
the rule, that whether negotiable paper is sold or discounted, or
endorsed over to pay a new debt or for a new purchase, or to
secure a new debt or an old debt, or to pay an old debt, it
becomes in each case the property of the holder, and carries with
it all the privileges of negotiable paper unless there be something
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in the particular transaction which is equivalent to fraud, actual
or constructive." It will be noticed that this language is com-
prehensive, and was doubtless intended to embrace every instance
in which such paper may be used and still retain its privileges.
But it is not sufficiently broad to cover this case, as we shall
presently see.
The doctrine that commercial paper may be properly used as
security for a pre-existing debt, has been disputed, and there are
conflicting decisions upon that point; but it is now pretty gene-
rally established.
The profession, however, did not readily acquiesce in the doc-
trine, inasmuch as there is an apparent hardship in allowing the
holder of such paper, who parted with nothing upon its credit, to
recover of one, who, as against other parties, has a good defence.
The reason upon which this doctrine rests, and without which the
law would undoubtedly have been determined otherwise, is, that
a very considerable portion of the negotiable paper made in busi-
ness, ts used in this way. We can easily understand, therefore,
that among business men, accustomed to deal in .this kind of paper,
the receii'ing or offering it as security for an old debt, is not in
itself calculated to excite suspicion, for the simple reason that it
is according to usage; and if according to usage, presumptively
at least, such use facilitates trade, and should receive the sanction
of the courts unless there is some real substantial objection to it.
But in the case before us no such usage appears. On the con-
trary, the purpose for which the paper was used is exceptional
and unusual. We apprehend that cases like this are rarely to be
met with in business circles. Let us examine it more carefully.
A man has a piece of negotiable paper, with which he wishes to
pay or secure certain debts. If there is but one debt, he can
transfer it directly to the creditor, and the law protects the trans-
action. That is according to the usual course of business. But
if he transfer it to a friend, to hold till due, and then collect it,
and with its avails pay the creditor, that is unusual and suspicious
upon its face, and requires explanation. Unless some good rea-
son can be shown for such a proceeding, the law ought not to
protect it. But it is said that here were several creditors, which
sufficiently explains the fact that the security was effected through
the intervention of a trustee. Let us test this position. If the
paper is right and free from defects, why not sell it in market, or
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get it discounted, and, with its avails, pay the debts at once ?
Or, if the debts are not to be paid until the paper is due and col-
lected, why not retain it in his own hands until due, and, if neces-
sary, sue and collect in his own name? Such a course would be
natural and usual. But what honest reason can be suggested
why it shohild be transferred to a third party, who has no interest
ii the matter, to be sued in his name? Such a course is unusual,
and not in due course of trade. The transaction at once suggests
the idea that there is some equity in favor of the maker, inherent
in the note itself, and which can be made available as against the
payee, and which the payee is asking to avoid. .
But there is another circumstance appearing in the case, which
makes the unusual character of the transaction still more appa-
rent. The creditors are informed of the transfer, they ratify and
confirm it, and direbt the commencembiit and prosecution of this
suit. What occasion is there for all this, except to make it appear
that the plaintiff is a trustee for the creditors? And why is it
desirable that it should appear that he is a trustee for the creditors,
unless for the very purpose of shutting out this defence ? If Yale
was in fact solvent, this proceeding was extraordinary and inex-
plicable upon any theory consistent with honesty and fair dealing.
At least no sufficient reason for it appears in the case. If he
"was insolvent, another and insurmountable difficulty is at once
encountered.
The conveyance not being in conformity to the provisions of
our Insblvbnt Law, and operating to pay the creditors iianhdd in
full, thereby giving them a preferenpe, contravdnes the policy of
that law, and is therefore void as against creditors. Surely, it
will not be contended that such a conveyance should receive the
sanction of this court as a legitimate mercantile transaction.
The fact that a part of this money was payable to the wife of
Yale, is worthy of notice also in this branch of the case. To
* that extent, as we have already seen, the plaintiff was the agent
of Yale. We have no occasion to say that this circumstance
alone renders this conveyance void at common law. But if there
was a secret trhst in favor of Yale, and the operation of the con-
veyance should be to defraud creditors, it certainly would be void
as against bredit6rs. A itaudulbriA conveyance can in ho sehse
be said to be in the usual course of business. But be this as it
may, the fact that Yale himself is still interested in this note,
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either in his own right or in right of his wife, should suggest to
all parties concerned an inquiry as to the reason and occasion of
this conveyance.
We are not referred to any case directly in point, and are not
aware that any exists; but we believe the views above expressed
are in harmony with reason and good sense, and not in conflict
with any adjudged case. In Bilng8 v. Collim, 44 Me. 271, it
was held that the assignment of negotiable paper, by operation
of a bankrupt or insolvent law, was not in the regular course of
trade, and that the assignee could only acquire the rights of the
insolvent. 'The opinion of the court is brief, simply announcing
the result without adducing any argument in its support; but we
have no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision. So far
as it goes it supports our position in the.present case.
For these reasons, after careful consideration, we have come
to the conclusion that this note was not taken in the regular
course of business, and that the judgment of the court below
upon that ground was erroneous and must be reversed.
In this opinion BUTLER, C. J., and FOSTER, J., concurred.
PARK, J., was absent, and SEYMOUR, J., did not sit.
The foregoing case is certainly one
of considerable importance to business
men. Two questions seem to arise.
Whether the endorsement was so far bond
fide and for valuable consideration as to
exclude equitable defences. 2. Whether
the transaction comes so far within .the
range of ordinary commercial usage in
the negotiation of bills and notes as to
transfer an absolute title to the endorsee,
or only one in trust for the real and
ultimate benefit of the endorser, thus
making the endorsee a mere agent of
the endorser, and by consequence con-
ferring no higher or better title than he
himself has.
In regard to the first question, there
could be no question so far as the en-
dorsement was for the benefit of the wife
of the endorser, merely as wife. The
wife might have stood in the same re-
lation as other creditors, by reason of
having made advances to her husband.
But nothing of that appears in this
case. Her claim rests merely upon the
relation of the parties, husband and
wife, and the duties growing out of the
relation. In this there is nothing of
the nature of a valuable or pecuniary
consideration. The consideration is good
and ample to support any otherwise
legal undertaking; but it is, after all,
in the nature of a gift and must be post-
poned to the claims of creditors even;
and could never be made the basis of an
endorsement of negotiable securities, so
as to exclnde equitable defences based
upon actual fraud in the concoction of
the instruments.
And although the portion of the secu-
rity sequestered for the benefit of cred-
itors may be said to rest upon the
valuable consideration, it is certainly
not in the ordinary c urse of commercial
transactions in the use of negotiable
paper. It is more of the nature of a
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general assignment of one's estate for
the benefit of creditors ; more analogous
to going into insolvency or bankruptcy,
than carrying forward business in the
ordinary course. It is common and en-
tirely in the due course of'business to
endorse a note or bill in payment or as
security for a pre-existing debt, and such
an endorsement of negotiable paper,
before due, will exclude equitable de-
fences. The cases are collected and
classified in Atkinson v. Brooks, 26 Vt.
569 ; and the note to Le Breton v.
Peirce, 1 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 35.
But when such an endorsement assumes
the form of a security for creditors
generally, it at once suggests a trust
for the benefit of the endorser, and
no court, we think, would, under such
circumstances, feel disposed to regard
the transaction as excluding equitable
defences. I. F. R.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
IN nz THOMAS U. RUTH.
A statute providing that no person shall sell intoxicating liquors without a per-
mit, to be granted by the county judge, if on application he shall be satisfied that
the applicant is a person "of good moral character," and that certain other
requisites of the law are complied with, is constitutional.
THOMAS U. RUTH applied to the Circuit Court of Page county
for permission to sell intoxicating liquors for medicinal, mechani-
cal, sacramental, and culinary purposes: permission was refused,
and thereupon he appealed to this court.
1VW. N.orsman, for appellant.
No appearance contr .
BEcK, .- By sections 1575-6 of the Revision, any citizen of
the state, except hotel-keepers, keepers of saloons, eating-houses,
grocery-keepers, and conTectioners, were permitted to sell intoxi-
cating liquors for mechanical, medicinal, culinary, and sacra-
mental purposes, upon presenting to the county judge a certificate
of twelve citizens of the township in which he resided that he
was a man of good moral character, and a citizen of the county
and state, and executing bond with sureties, and conditioned as
therein prescribed. The duty of a person so authorized to sell
liquors, and sundry regulations touching the same, are prescribed
in these sections. These provisions are amended by chap. 128
of the Acts of the 12th General Assembly, which provides that
upon application being made for the permission, a day shall be
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fixed for the hearing, a notice thereof be given of the time and in
the manner prescribed, and that any resident of the county may,
on the day of final hearing, show cause against the allowance of the
permission, which " shall be refused unless the county judge shall
be fully satisfied that the requirements of the law have in all
respects been fully complied with, that the applicant is a person
of good moral character, and that taking into consideration the
wants of the locality, and the number of permits already granted,
such permit would be necessary and proper for the accommoda-
tion of the neighborhood." The application of appellant was
rejected, as we gather from the abstract before us, on the ground
that he was not a fit and proper person as contemplated by the
law to receive the permission. No question is made upon this
point. Counsel concede that appellant "1 does not possess the
standard of morals contemplated by the statute." But it is
argued that the law which limits the granting of permissions of
this kind to persons of 'good moral character, is in conflict with
the Constitution of the state and therefore void. The validity of
no other provision of the statute is attacked. Counsel bases his
argument upon article 1st, sect. 1st, of the Constitution, which
declares that all men are equal and endowed-with the right of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and sect. 6th of
the same article, which forbids the General Assembly granting
" to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities,
which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens." He argues that as intoxicating liquors are property,
the General Assembly cannot restrict dealing in them for lawful
purposes to any class of citizens-as to citizens of good moral
character.
The breadth and design of these coflstitutional provisions, to
secure equality of all and the enjoyment of property by all, are
fully understood and as fully conceded. But the equality secured
to the citizen cannot be exercised to the damage of the lives and
property of others; neither can property be acquired, enjoyed,
and disposed of to the peril of the lives, health, happiness, and
property of others. The Constitution does not interfere with the
police power of the state to protect the people in their lives,
health, and property. The state is clothed with the power to
prevent injury to these. See Constitution, Art. 1st, Sect. 1st.
Gunpowder, nitro-glycerine, and other explosive agents are pro-
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perty, yet the state may confine traffic in them to certain classes
of persons, and confine the storage to certain localities. Certain
poisons are property, but the sale of them may be restricted to
certain persons, namely, those having sufficient intelligence to
know when they ought to be used, and of sufficient character for
prudence to give assurance that these deadly agents will not be
carelessly administered. So intoxicating liquors are deemed by
the law, agents that are dangerous to the morals, health, and
lives of the people, though useful for proper purposes; their sale
in the hands of men not of good character would be abused, and
the people suffer therefrom. A preventive restriction is thrown
around their sale by permitting men of good moral character
alone to deal in them. But counsel exclaim, Have not men of
bad moral character the same rights as men of good morals ?
Undoubtedly all are equal before the law as to the rights of
property. But no one has the right to deal in these liquors, so
far as his own interests are concerned; but as the wants of the
people for certain lawful purposes demand that some should be
allowed to sell them, the privilege is granted to certain persons
not because they have a right to sell the liquors, but because the
wants of the people demand the sale should be authorized to
some extent. and they will be less likely to do injury than others
who might be intrusted with the privilege. The sale of the
liquors by all men of good morals is not permitted, and the law
is not therefore intended, nor does it operate, to secure com-
merce in intoxicating liquors to all persons of that class. It has
been found that the health and lives of the people demand that a
few licensed persons be empowered to sell these liquors for lawful
purposes, and that all others be forbidden to deal in them. Of
those who are authorized, the law requires satisfactory proof of
good moral character. In this respect it differs not from all
license laws, which bestow privileges upon fit' and proper persons
making application therefor. These laws have always been sus-
tained. The authorities cited by counsel are not in conflict with
the foregoing views.
In our opinion the provision of the statute in question is not in
conflict with the Constitution.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
The foregoing opinion certainly chal- The statute of Iowa, after providing
lenges attention, if not criticism, for the prohibition of sales of intoxi-
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eating liquors generally, provides fur-
ther, "That any citizen of the state and
resident of the county in which he may
be at the time, except hotel-keepers,
keepers of saloons, eating-houses, gro-
cery-keepers and confectioners, is per-
mitted to buy and sell intoxicating
liquors for mechanical, medicinal, culi-
nary, and sacramental purposes only:
Provided, he shall first procure the cer-
tificate of twelve citizens of the township
in which he resides that he is of good
moral character and a citizen of the
county and state, and shall give bond in
the penal sum of not less than one thou-
sand dollars, with two good and suffi-
cient sureties to be approved by the
county judge; that he will conform to
the provisions of this act and the act to
which this is amendatory:" 1575,
Rev. 1860.
The twelfth General Assembly passed
an act; the 1st section requires that a
day for final hearing be fixed at the
time of filing the application for per-
mits, and also requires notice of such
final hearing to be given by publication;
and provides further, as follows :-
Sect. 2. "At such final hearing any
resident of the county may appear and
show cause why such permit should not
be granted, and the same shall be re-
fused unless the county judge (Circuit
Court now) shall be fully satisfied that
the requirements of the law have in all
respects been fully complied with ; that
the applicant is a person of g6od moral
character, and that taking into conside-
ration the wants of the locality, and the
number of permits already granted,
such permit would be necessary and
proper for the accommodation of the
neighborhood:" Chap. 128, Acts 12th
General Assembly.
By the Constitution of Iowa, it is
declared that "All men are, by nature,
free and equal, and have certain inalien-
able rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting pro-
perty, and pursuing and obtaining safety
and happiness :" Art. 1, Bill of Rights.
The application of Ruth in the fore-
going case was refused on the ground
(a proposition which was admitted in
argument) that the applicant was not
possessed of that standard of morals
required by the statute, and the refusal
was sustained on appeal by the forego-
ing opinion.
That intoxicating liquors are pro-
perty, and that the constitutional provi-
sion above recited contemplates that all
citizens, moral and immoral, may ac-
quire, possess, protect, and dispose of
property, are propositions which seem to
be admitted in the foregoing opinion.
And, that the rights secured to the
citizen in the above constitutional pro-
vision cannot be exercised by one citizen
to the exclusion of others in the enjoy-
ment of the same rights, or rights
guarantied by different provisions of
the same instrument; that one citizen
cannot enjoy his right of property to
the damage of others in the enjoyment
of their rights of property, health,
comfort, morals, happiness, &c., &c.,
are propositions which may safely be
conceded.
In short, this constitutional provision
was made for all, as its language plainly
imports, and for every species of pro-
perty, certainly every kind of property
recognised as such, at the time of the
adoption of the provision above cited.
The language is general. It is as broad
and comprehensive as anything which
could have been selected for the occasion.
If it can be said that it does not apply to
one kind of property, then it can be
said with an equal show of reason that
it does not apply to any other kind of
property, which thd prejudices of the
hour may desire to place beyond the
protection of the law.
The question is not, whether the con-
stitution interferes with the police power
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of the state to protect the people in their
lives, health, an property. All of these
are amply secured by the constitution,
izf justly administered. The general
purpose of the constitution is to secure
these rights to all, and it is plainly the
duty, and within the power of the state
(and this is its police power, as also the
limit of that power) to pass laws which
shall carry out that general purpose and
intention.
The opinion above quoted adopts as
the principle upon which it is proposed
to stand, ", That the equality secured to
the citizen cannot be exercised to the
damage of the lives and property of
others; nor can property be acquired,
enjoyed, and disposed of to the peril of
the lives, health, happiness, and pro-
perty of others." And this is not denied,
for the reason that any other rule would
produce inequality. But, we may add
as the converse of this proposition, and
in support of the other side of the case,
that the right of the public to the pre-
servation of its morals, health, happi-
ness, &c., &c., cannot be enjoyed to the
exclusion of the enjoyment of the right
of property, because the same inequality
would be thereby introduced. Yet this is
the exact effect of the opinion quoted
above, for the court in the same breath
proceed to say, that an act which provides
for, and produces precisely these conse-
quences, is not in conflict with any con-
stitutional provision.
We think the act in question does pro-
vide that one citizen or class of citizens
may enjoy his or their rights under the
constitution to the damage and even
exclusion of other citizens or classes of
citizens in the enjoyment of their rights.
To illustrate, let it be supposed that the
whole community is divided into two
classes, one of moral character and the
other of immoral character in the sense
of this act.
Does not the act in question say in
unmistakable terms, that the portion of
I
the community whose characters are
moral shall enjoy their rights of pro-
perty, health, happiness, public morals,
&c., &c., to the exclusion of the other
portion's right of property in intoxi-
cating liquors? We think it does most
clearly. The theory of the act is, that
the right of property in intoxicating
liquors cannot he enjoyed in any manner
by a man of bad moral character, as
contemplated by the act, without inter-
fering with the moral portion of the
community in the enjoyment of their
rights to the preservation of the public
morals, public health, &c., and in order
to protect the latter the legislature of
Iowa have undertaken to destroy the
former, by saying that the immoral man
shall not enjoy the right of property in
intoxicating liquors at all. This is pre-
cisely what the court, in the foregoing
opinion, have said cannot be done, with
reference to the right of the citizen to the
enjoyment of health, preservation of
public morals, &c.
We agree with the court as to the
breadth and design of the constitutional
provision referred to.
It was intended to secure the right of
property to all, and in every kind of
recognised property. It was also in.
tended to secure the right of the citizen
and the public to the preservation of the
public health, public morals, peace,
quiet, happiness, &c., &c.
What then is to be done? Clearly it
is the duty of the legislature, in the ex-
ercise of the police power of the state, to
secure by appropriate legislation the en-
joyment of all of these rights. It is as
important that the right of the citizen to
acquire and dispose of property should
be protected, as that any other right
should be. And to abolish the right to
acquire and dispose of any one kind of
property, even though it be in good faith
to secure the more complete enjoyment
of some other right, is just as much
beyond the power of the legislature, as
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it would be, to Abolish the constitution
in toto. Each right defined by the Bill
of Rights is as sacred and inviolable as
each other right therein defined, and to
make any one yield to another, is to lay
the foundation for thatloose and irregu-
lar form of government which it was
the design of the constitution, and of
society organizing government, to pro-
hibit. Something was wanted to define
and secure certain natural, fundamental,
and inviolable rights. It was thought
that a written constitution would do this,
but if the legislature, under pretence of
more perfectly securing one of such
rights, may abolish others, then the
whole scheme is a failure.
We believe that the legislature have no
such power, that all of the rights defined
by the constitution are intended to stand
together, that they should be reconciled
into harmony and concord with each
other, and that the police power of the
state can only be exercised to carry out
this purpose. It is the duty of the
legislature (and of course within the
power before-mentioned) to regulate, to
prescribe the mode and the manner of
enjoying these rights, and in doing so,
the right may be very seriously affected,
though a substantial right must be left in
all cases. The police power is exhausted
when it has done this. It cannot be ex-
tended to the abolition of the right itself,
for if it could, the Bill of Rights would
be subordinate to that vague and unde-
fined power, and at the mercy of a legis-
lature elected by a mere majority.
The principle is very concisely stated
by JonNsow, J., in Wynehamer v. Te
People, 3 Kernan 421; where it is said,
"The same sort of question is presented
in respect to the infringement by legis-
lation of men's private rights, and the
regulation of them, and their enjoyment.
The substantial right cannot be destroyed ;
its enjoyment is not an offence, and
legislation cannot make it an offence.
At the same time the mode of enjoyment
in its broadest sense, is subject to legis-
lation, though it (the right) be affected
very injuriously, provided a substantial
right is left."
Does the act in question, under the
construction given, leave a substantial
right of property in intoxicating liquors
to Ruth? We think not.
The same question arises under sta-
tutes that affect the remedy on contracts,
with reference to that pravision of the
Constitution of the United States which
forbids the legislature to impair the ob-
ligation of contracts by law. The legis-
lature may regulate the remedy, and
may alter and abridge it so as to affect
the value of the contract very materially
"c so long as they (contracts' are sub-
mitted to the ordinary and regular course
of justice, and the existing remedies
preserved in substance and with integrity :
Holmes v. Lansing, 3 John. Cas. 75;
Morse v. Gould, 1 Kern. 281.
The substantial right guarantied by the
Constitution of the United States, to the
citizen to enforce the obligation of his
contract must not be destroyed by the
legislature.
Again, the same question arises under
statutes which assume to regulate the
exercise of corporate franchises. The
legislature may regulate the mode and
the manner of enjoying the rights con-
ferred by the charter, but it cannot des-
troy the charter itself or any essential
right under it.
Thus, in Benson v. Mayor, &c., 10
Barb. 45, the court say, "The state may
legislate touching them so far as they
are publici juris. Thus, laws may be
passed to punish neglect or misconduct
in conducting the ferries, to secure the
safety of passengers from danger and
imposition, &c. But the state cannot
take away the ferries themselves, nor de-
prive the city of their legitimate rents and
profits."
Why? Because the right of the city
to the ferries and their legitimate rents
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and profits was fixed by charter or con-
tract, the obligation of which was held
sacred by the constitution. If the legis-
lature cannot destroy the rights of a
corporation under a contract, the obli-
gation of which is secured by the consti-
tution for the preservation of the lives,
safety, and comfort of the public, upon
what principle can it destroy the rights
of an individual whose rights are directly
secured by the constitution 7
The opinion of the Supreme Court of
Iowa seems to be predicated upon the
idea that the police power of the state
is some extraordinary power which ex-
ists independent of the constitution, and
which may be exercised by the legisla-
ture when the "public good" requires
it in opposition to the constitution.
The true rule is, however, that what-
ever cannot be accomplished without an
infraction of the constitution cannot be
considered a " public good," and is in
contemplation of law a public calamity
when accomplished.
The police power of the state is
derived from the constitution, and is no
more than a power to carry out and en-
force each and all of its provisions, and
in no sense is it a power to destroy,
when in the opinion of the legislature
the "public good" or the "public
morals" require it.
In the case of Barker v. People, 3
Cow. 686, the court said: * * * "The
whole constitution must be supported,
and all its powers reconciled into con-
cord. A law which should declare it a
crime to exercise any fundamental right
of the constitution (as the right of ac-
quiring and disposing of property, we
add) would infringe an express rule of
the system, and hence is not within the
general power over crimes." * * * *
"Many rights are plainly expressed
and intended to be inviolable in all cir-
cumstances. A law enacting that a
criminal should, as a punishment for
his offence, forfeit the right of trial by
jury, would contravene the constitution,
and a deprivation of this right could not
be allowed in the form of a punishment.
Any other right thus secured as univer-
sal and inviolable, must equally prevail
against the power of the legislature to
select and prescribe punishments."
From this case we see that the legis-
lature, in the exercise of its plenary
power over crimes and punishments,
could not do what the legislature of
Iowa has undertaken to do by the act
in question. The legislature cannot
declare it to be a crime to exercise the
right of acquiring and disposing of pro-
perty, noi can it declare a forfeiture of
the right as a punishment for any other
offence. Still, the exercise of the right
in a particular manner may be declared
a crime, or may be forfeited as a pun-
ishment for some other crime, so long
as the substantial right itself is not de-
clared forfeited or made criminal. It
is upon this principle that all regulation
rests. The legislature may prohibit
sales of intoxicating liquors to be used
as a beverage, for such legislation only
goes to the manner of enjoying the right.
The right can be "substantially" en-
joyed without such sales. And the same
rule we understand to apply to all other
kinds of property, which under certain
circumstances are acknowledged to be
dangerous to the well-being of society.
The court say, in the foregoing opin-
ion, that "certain poisons are property,
but the sale of them may be restricted to
certain persons, namely, those having
sufficient intelligence to know when they
ought to be used, and sufficient charac-
ter for prudence to give assurance that
these deadly agents will not be carelessly
administered." This proposition is not
denied, for it also only goes to the man-
ner of enjoying the right, and is there-
fore not a parallel case. If the party
desiring to "acquire, possess, and dis-
pose of these deadly agents" does not
himself possess the requisite qualifica-
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tion, he can still enjoy the right "sub-
stantially," by employing some one
possessed of the proper qualifications, to
handle the property for him. Such
legislation would undoubtedly affect the
right, but it does not destroy it. It does
not necessarily preclude the citizen from
"buying and selling" to require him to
buy and sell in a certain manner.
The legislature of the state in the ex-
ercise of the police power, to secure to
all the substantial enjoyment of all the
rights defined by the constitution, can
compel the enjoyment by every indivi-
dual of his rights in a manner not to con-
flict with others in the equal enjoyment
of their rights, not however legislating
upon the manner, so as to destroy the
substantial right.
" Sic utere tuo ut alienutn non hedas"
is the maxim which lies at the foundation
of the power. And to whatever enact-
ment the maxim will not apply the
power itself does not extend: Cooley
Constitutional Limitations 577.
According to the foregoing opinion,
however, it is not sufficient that the
citizen should so enjoy his own rights as
not to interfere with others in the enjoy-
ment of theirs. But an immoral man must
not enjoy certain of his rights at all. Not,
indeed, because such enjoyment will
necessarily interfere with others in the
enjoyment of their rights, but because
he may abuse the right.
If such a proposition can be main-
tained, then there is no right that is be-
yond the control of the legislature, for
we may, and indeed all do, abuse almost
every right that we enjoy. All the
legislature can do is to prohibit the
abuse, and punish us for a violation of
the prohibition. No other theory is at
all consistent with civil liberty.
Many other authorities might be cited
in support of the foregoing views, but it
is scarcely necessary. A moment's re-
flection on the practical application of the
rule as stated in the opinion, in support
of which no authorities are cited by the
court, we think, will show that the doc-
trine cannot be maintained. The opin-
ion is plainly inconsistent with itself,
for the reason that the principle which
the court states as the authority for pro-
tecting the public in the enjoyment of
its health, comfort, morals, &c., &c.,
unless violated, will protect every indivi-
dual, in some measure at least, of enjoy-
ment of the right of property in intoxi-
cating liquors, and every other kind of
property as well. Such a substantial
enjoyment is prohibited, however, to
Ruth, by the statute in question and the
opinion quoted above.
W. W. M.
United States Circuit Court. District of Indiana.
THE EVANSVILE NATIONAL BANK v. METROPOLITAN NA-
TIONAL BANK OF NEW YORK, AND THE ASSIGNEES OF
WATTS, CRANE & CO.'
A transfer of stock in a banking corporation, organized under the Act of June
3d 1864, to a bondfide holder, is valid though the seller or pledgor be at the time
indebted to the bank, and a by-law of the bank declared that no transfer of the
stock by any shareholder indebted to the bank should be made without the consent
of the board of directors. Such a by-law in effect attempts to create a lien upon
I We are indebted to Josiah II. Bissell, Reporter for the United States Courts
for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, for the following opinion.
EVANSVILLE BANK v. METROPOLITAN BANK.
stock for debts of the holder, and the result is the same as if a loan were made
upon the security of the stock-a transaction forbidden by the 35th section of the
Act.
APPEAL from District Court.
The Evansville National Bink was organized in January 1865
under the Act of Congress of June 3d 1864, 13 Stat. 99.
One of the articles of association provided that the directors
might prohibit the transfer of stock without their consent. Ac-
cordingly a by-law declared that no transfer of the stock should
be made without the consent of the board of directors by any
shareholder who was indebted to the bank, and certificates of
stock were to contain this provision. After the adoption of this
by-law Watts, Crane & Co. became the owners of 150 shares of
stock, and Crane, one of the firm, of 50 shares; certificates were
issued for these shares in conformity with the above by-law.
Watts, Crane & Co. did business with the Evansville National
Bank, and were indebted to the bank from the time they became
holders of the stock for money loaned upon bills drawn, endorsed
or accepted by them in the usual course of trading.
On the 15th of September 1866, Watts, Crane & Co. borrowed
$30,000 of the Metropolitan National Bank of New York, and
they and Crane delivered their certificates of stock as a pledge
to secure the money so borrowed, and attached to the certificates,
bills of sale, and power of attorney for the transfer of the stock.
On the 15th of April 1867, Watts, Crane & Co. became
indebted to the Evansville National Bank on an acceptance for
$25,000. At this time the Evansville Bank had no notice of the
pledge previously made to the Metropolitan Bank. The members
of the firm of Watts, Crane & Co. were declared bankrupts by
the United States District Court of Indiana, March 3d 1868.
The District Court held that the pledge to the Ietropolitan Bank
was binding, notwithstanding the by-law under which the Evans-
ville Bank claimed a lien upon the stock.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DRUmMOND, J.-The only question in the case is, whether this
by-law was valid under the law of 1864 already cited. The 8th
section of that act authorizes the board of directors to make by-
laws, but declares they must not be inconsistent with its pro-
visions.
The 35th section declares that no association shall make any
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loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital
stock, nor be the purchaser or holder of any such shares unless to
prevent loss on a debt previously contracted in good faith..
The counsel of the plaintiff in the able argument he has pre-
sented, claims that the operation of the by-law upon the shares
of stock because of the indebtedness of Watts, Crane & Co., and
their transfer to the Metropolitan Bank without the consent of
the board of directors, was not a loan or discount made on the
security of the shares; that there should be a distinct assignment
or hypothecation of the stock as security for a loan or discount
made ; and some authorities have been cited which seem to main-
tain that principle. But if there is a by-law which declares in
substance and effect that for all loans or discounts made to the
shareholder a lien shall exist against his stock, the result would
be the same as if there was a separate transaction and security
given in each case. The shareholder always has the credit on
the security of his stock, and thus the very object is accomplished
which the 35th section sought to prevent-the absorption of the
shares into the assets of the bank. And it will be observed that
the law only allows the stock to be taken by the bank as security,
or purchased to hold to avoid loss on a debt previously contracted
in good faith, and on these the stock is to be retained by the bank
only a limited time.
An extended examination of the authorities cited by counsel is
unnecessary, because in the case of The First National Bank of
South Bend v. Lanier, recently decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, (11 Wallace 369), the question involved here
is discussed by that court, and a principle established that is
decisive of this case.
In that case the bank had made a by-law declaring that the
stock of the bank should be transferred only subject to the provi-
sions of the 36th section of the Act of 1863 (by which a share-
holder was prevented from transferring his stock when he owed
the bank). The bank sought to avail itself of this by-law notwith-
standing the repeal of the 36th section by the Act of 1864, and
the court held that could not be done. This is in effect decid-
ing that no such by-law could be in force under the provisions of
the Act of 1864. The language of the court is, "Congress evi-
dently intended, by leaving out of the law of 1864 the 36th sec-
tion of the Act of 1863, to relieve the holders of bank shares
ST. JOHN v. SOUTHERN EXPRESS CO.
from the restrictions imposed by that section. The policy on the
subject was changed, and the direcfors of banking institutions
were in effect notified that thereafter they must deal with their
shareholders as they dealt with other people. As the restrictions
fell, so did that part of the by-law relating to the subject fall
with them."
The decision of the District Court is affirmed.
United &a.tes Circuit Court. Southern .Ditrict of Alabama.
NEWTON ST. JOHN v. THE SOUTHERN EXPRESS COMPANY.
The reception by an express company of a package for transportation directed
to a point beyond its route, and the receipt of the entire compensation for the
transportation to that point is sufficient to make out a primd fade case of contract
to carry and deliver the package to that point.
To avoid liability in such case the company must show a specific contract to
carry only to its own terminus, or a settled and uniform rule not to assume lia-
bility beyond that point, which rule must be brought home to the consignee either
by express notice or by a notoriety so general that he may fairly be presumed to
have had notice.
Plaintiff delivered a package marked to a consignee in New York, to defendants
an express company in Mobile, paid the freight for the entire distance, and took a
receipt stating "that this company is to forward the same to its agent nearest or
most convenient to destination only, and then to deliver the same to other parties,
they to complete the transportation; such delivery to terminate all liability of
this company for such package." The company's route extended only to Lynch-
burg, but it had an arrangement with Adams Express Company to transport such
packages to any point on the latter's route, and receive a pro rata share of the
freight. Held, that the Adams Express Company was the agent of defendants
within the terms of the receipt, and defendants were liable for failure to deliver
in New York.
If an express company have a settled and uniform rule that money packages
must be sealed and endorsed in a certain manner, and such rule is brought home
to the knowledge of the consignor who neglects or intentionally omits to comply
with it, and the company, in ignorance of the special value of the package, takes
ordinary care of it only, the company will not be liable for its loss.
If, however, the money is stolen or converted by an agent of the company, the
latter will be liable for its value on a count for money had and received, notwith-
standing the violation of. its rules by the consignor.
THIS was an action against a carrier for failure to deliver goods
delivered to it for transportation.
B. . Smith and T. ff. Hferndon, for plaintiff.
ST. JOHN v. SOUTHERN EXPRESS CO.
Win. G. Jones and J. P. Soutiworth, for defendant.
WooDs, J., charged the jury as follows:-
Gentlemen of the jury :-The plaintiff claims that the defendant
being a common carrier, on the 26th day of May 1866, under-
took and agreed with plaintiff, for a valua'ble consideration, to
transport from Mobile, Alabama, and to deliver to J. B. Alex-
ander & Co., in the city of New York,. a sealed package which
the plaintiff on that day delivered to the agents of defendant in
Mobile, containing six thousand dollars, the property of the
plaintiff. That by and through the negligence and carelessness
and improper conduct of the defendant and its servants, said
package and its contents were wholly lost to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff further avers that on the 3d day of June 1866, the
defendant as such common carrier, undertook and agreed with
the plaintiff for a valuable consideration, to transport from Mo-
bile, Alabama, and to deliver to J. B. Alexander & Co., in New
York city, another sealed package, which the plaintiff on that day
delivered to the agents of defendants in Mobile, containing five
thousand dollars, the property of the plaintiff, and that by the
negligence, carelessness, and improper conduct of the defendant
and its servants, said last-named package and its contents were also
wholly lost to the plaintiff. He thereupon seeks to recover of
the defendant the amount of money contained in said packages,
with interest. He has also included in his declaration counts for
money had and received, and upon an account stated. The de-
fendant pleads the general issue, with leave to give in evidence
any matter that might be specially pleaded.
This action is brought against the defendant as a common car-
rier. The undertaking of a common carrier is to deliver the
goods intrusted to him against all events but the act of God, or
the public enemy, unless his liability is limited by contract.
Before the plaintiff can recover, he must establish his case by
proof substantially as he has stated it. Your first inquiry will
therefore be, did the plaintiff deliver the packages containing
money, or either of them, to the defendant, to be carried to New
York, and delivered as alleged, and did the defendant, for a valua-
ble consideration, undertake and agree to convey them to New
York city, and deliver them to J. B. Alexander & Co., as the
plaintiff avers, and has the defendant failed so to deliver them ?
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On the question of the delivery of the packages to the agent of
the defendant in Mobile, and the failure of the defendant to de-
liver them to J. B. Alexander & Co., in New York, I presume
you will have little trouble. I do not understand the defendant
to controvert these facts. They must be proven, however, to
your satisfaction. But the defendant alleges that its lines of
business reach only as far north as Lynchburg, Virginia, on the
route to New York city; that this fact waa known to plaintiff,
and that its agreement was not to convey the packages to New
York, but to convey them to Lynchburg, Virginia, and then safely
to deliver them to Adams' Express Company; that it did so
transport and'safely deliver the packages, and that it is therefore
not liable to plaintiff for any loss which occu'rred after such deli-
very to the Adams Express Company.
You are to decide, gentlemen, from the facts in the case, and
controlled by the rules of law as I shall give them to you, what
the contract of the defendant with the plaintiff was.
I instruct you that the reception by an express company of a
package for transportation directed to a point beyond the route
of the express company, afid the receipt by such company of
the entire compensation for the transmission and delivery of the
package to the point to which it is directed, makes out a Primd
facie case of a contract to carry and deliver the package accord-
ing to the'superscription, and will bind the company unless a
different contract is shown, or a settled and uniform rule estab-
lished by the company not to be bound beyond its own line, which
rule is brought home to the consignor either by express notice or
by a notoriety so general that he may fairly be presumed to have
had notice.
If you find the fact to be that the defendant received the pack-
ages of the plaintiff directed to J. B. Alexander & Co., New
York, for transmission, and received the pay for the entire route
from Mobile to New York, then I instruct you that prind facie the
plaintiff has shown a contract on the part of defendant to carry
the packages to New York and deliver them according to the
tirection, and that the Adams Express Company and its servants
were the agents of defendant to complete said transmission and
lelivery. This proof would, however, only make a priWrnr facie
'ase, and the defendant may rebut it by other proof.
It was competent for the defendant to contract that it was to
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be bound for the safe transmission of the packages over its own
lines only, and if it has satisfied you by proof that it did so con-
tract, then it cannot be held liable.for the default of the Adams
or any other company which undertook to complete the convey-
ance of the packages.
I believe it is not claimed that the defendant made any such
contract expressly with the plaintiff, but it is insisted that such
contract may be faitly implied from the form of receipt given by
the defendant for money packages, and that such receipts must,
from their general use by the company, have been known to the
plaintiff. The defendant says that its receipts for money pack-
ages contained a provision in these words: "that this company
is to forward the same to its agent nearest or most convenient to
destination only, and then to deliver the same to other parties,
they to complete the transportation; such delivery to terminate
all liability of this company for such packages."
You will first determine from the proof whether the contents of
this receipt were brought home to the knowledge of the plaintiff.
If you find they were, then I say to you, that the true construc-
tion of this provision is that the defendant undertakes to deliver
packages at any point upon its own routes or upon the routes of
any other company with which it has an arrangement to receive,
convey, and deliver packages for a pro rata share of the compen-
sation paid by the shipper, but when the terminus of its own
route or the route of such a connecting company is reached, and
the package is to go to a point beyond, then the defendant is only
bound to deliver the same to other parties to complete the trans-
portation, and on such delivery its liability ceases.
I instruct you, gentlemen, that if you find from the proof that
there was an understanding between the defendant and the Adams
Express Company, by which the latter agreed to receive from the
former at the end of its route all packages for transmission over
the routes of the Adams Express Company, and to deliver them
according to the superscription at any point on the routes of the
Adams Express Company, and received a pro rata share of the
money paid the defendant for the transportation of the package,
then the Adams Express Company was the agent of the defend-
ant referred to in the language of the receipt. And if the Adams
Express Company had an agency or office in New York, it would
have been the duty of this defendant, under that receipt, to carry
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the package to New York, either by itself or its agent, the Adams
Express Company, and then deliver it according to its superscrip-
tion. You are not, however, to confine your consideration upon
this point to the terms of this receipt exclusively. You may
examine the way-bills and other blank forms of the defendant to
ascertain what its contract was, and you may take into considera-
tion any statements you may find to have been made to plaintiff
by the superintendent or other agent of the defendant in refer-
ence to the transmission of these or other packages, or any spe-
cial contract or understanding made by defendant's agent with
plaintiff.
If you shall .find under these instructions that the defendant
only contracted to carry the packages of the plaintiff over its
own routes, and then to deliver them to another company for
transmission to its destination, and that it has performed this con-
tract, then that is an end of the case against the defendant, so
far as its liability as a common carrier is concerned. If, how-
ever, you find that the defendant undertook to convey the packages
to New York and then deliver them to the persons to whom they
were addressed, you will then proceed to consider another branch
of the defendant's defence. This is, that the rule of the defendant
was that packages containing money should be sealed in a certain
way, that the amount of the contents should be endorsed upon
the package, and a certain rate of compensation for carriage in
'proportion to the amount of money conveyed -should be paid.
That the plaintiff, well knowing this rule, placed the money which
he alleges was lost in an envelope not sealed according to the
rules, nor containing a statement endorsed upon the envelope of
the amount of the contents, and that he only paid the rate charged
by the defendant for the transmission of an ordinary letter con-
taining no enclosure of value; and that by reason of this default
on the part of the plaintiff the packages were intrusted to an
agent of the Adams Express Company in New York, who was
only employed to deliver ordinary letters, and not valuable pack-
ages, and was thereby lost.
Upon this branch of the defence I instruct you, that the rules
of the company, in order to have any influence upon the decision
of the case, must have been known to the plaintiff, and these rules
must have been settled and uniform. If these rules were not by
the proof brought home to the notice of the plaintiff, or if the
ST. JOHN v. SOUTHERN EXPRESS CO.
defendant was in the habit of departing from them, and allowing
exceptions to be made to them, and these facts were known to
plaintiff, or if there was any understanding or agreement between
the plaintiff and the agent or superintendent, that the rule was
not to be enforced against the plaintiff, in either of these cases
the existence of the rules can have no effect upon the decision of
this case. In short, the rule must be settled, uniform, and known
to plaintiff. If you find they were thus settled, uniform, and
known to the plaintiff, and no exception was made by the agent
of defendant in his favor exonerating him from a compliance
therewith, and you find that the contents and value of the pack-
ages sent by plaintiff were improperly concealed by him from the
defendant for the purpose of depriving the defendant of a part
of the compensation it would otherwise have claimed for the
transportation and risk, the defendant would not be liable if using
the ordinary vigilance which a prudent man would exercise over
his own property of the same apparent value. I instruct you
further, that if by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to comply
with the rules of the defendant known to him, the defendant was
ignorant of the value of the package, and, in consequence thereof,
was induced to intrust the package to a messenger who was em-
ployed only to deliver packages of no intrinsic value, and failed
to place it in the hands of its messenger known to be honest and
trustworthy, who was uniformly employed to deliver valuable
packages, and by the dishonesty of the messenger to whom the
package was intrusted, it was lost, in that case the defendant
would not be liable.
If you should find for the defendant upon these issues, it would
nevertheless be your duty to consider that branch of the plaintiff's
case which arises upon what are called the common counts.
Under them the plaintiff claims that the Adams Express Company
is the agent of the defendant, that the Adams Company, as such
agent, has not lost the money of plaintiff, or all of it, but has it
or a large part of it in its possession, or has converted it to its
own use. If you find, under the instructions already given you,
that the Adams Express Company is the agent of the defendant,
and that it has retained the money of the plaintiff in its posses-
sion, or has recovered it from any person who stole it, then you
should find a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount which you
may decide has come to the possession of the Adams Express
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Company and is retained by it, or has been converted by it to its
own use, with interest from the date of demand if you should find
that a demand has been made, if not, from the comm6ncement of
this suit. For although the plaintiff may have knowingly violated
the rules of the defendant in the manner of transmitting this
money, still that does not divest the plaintiff of his property in
the money, nor authorize the defendant, either by itself or its
agent, to confiscate it. The defendant is bound to pay it over on
demand with interest from the date of demand.
Supreme Court of _Pennsylvania.
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY v. PETER COPLEY.
Where a bond is signed by an illiterate person upon misrepresentations as to
its contents it is not his deed, but is void ab initio. In such case it is not
material whether the obligee had knowledge of the misrepresentation or not. But
where the contents are correctly stated, but the obligor is induced to sign it by
misrepresentations of facts, it is his bond, though he may avoid it for the fraud.
It is not the nature of the punishment but of the offence which determines its
infamous character so as to disqualify a witness convicted of it, and embezzlement
is not in Pennsylvania such a crime.
ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill county.
This was a feigned issue to try the question whether a certain
bond, on which judgment had been entered under a warrant of
attorney, was the deed of Peter Copley, as one of the sureties of
Thomas Fogarty, a collector of taxes. It was proved on the trial
that Fogarty obtained the signature of Copley, who was an illit-
erate man, by representing to him that the paper was a petition
to the county commissioners for his appointment as tax-collector.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGNEW, J.-The county contended that the deception mattered
not, unless it be shown that the county had a knowledge of the
fraud before accepting the bond. The court below held that the
misrepresentation of the contents of the paper avoided it as a
bond. The issue, therefore, was the same as if, to a declaration
on the bond, non est factum had been pleaded. The instruction
of the court was right and follows the distinction stated in Green
v. N'orth Buffao Tp., 6 P. F. Smith 114, between a defence
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resting upon facts which are misstated in order to induce a party
to enter into a bond, the contents of which he knows; and one
resting on a misrepresentation of the contents of the instrument
itself, to an illiterate person. In the former it was said the bond is
the obligation of the party who seals it, but is avoided by the
false inducement to enter into it; in the latter it is not his deed
or bond at all. No authority was cited for this elementary
principle, and it is argued that the second proposition is unsound.
But it was the first resolution in Thoroughgood's Case, in the time
of Lord COKE, 2 Reports 9 b, in these words: "First, that
although the party to whom the writing is made, or other by his
procurement, doth not read the writing; but a stranger of his
own head read it in other words than it in truth is; yet it shall
not bind the party who delivereth it; for it is not material who
readeth the writing, so as he who maketh it be a layman, and
being not lettered, be (without any covin in himself) deceived,
and that is proved by the usual form of pleading in such a case,
that is to say, that he was a layman and not learned and
that the deed was read to him in other words, &c., genernlly,
without showing by whom it was read." The second resolu-
tion in Thoroughgood's Case was that an illiterate man need
not execute a deed before it is read to him in a language he
understands; but if he do, without desiring it to be read, the
deed is binding. And see 2 Blackst. Com. *304-308. And
says Mr. Chitty, in his Pleadings, vol. 1, *483. The defendant
may give evidence under the plea of non est factum that the
deed was void at common law ab initio ; or that it was obtained
by fraud; or whilst the party was drunk, a married woman,
or a lunatic; or that it became void after it was made and before
the commencement of the action, by erasure, alteration, addi-
tion, &c. See also 1 Saunders on P1. & Ev. *407. The very
point in this case was decided in Stover v. Weir, 10 S. & R. 25.
That was an action on a single bill to which a defence was set up
that the writing had been obtained by falsely reading it as a
receipt, and requesting the defendant to sign it as a witness. The
plea setting forth the facts specially was treated as a special non
estfactum. See also Bauer v. Both, 4 Rawle 93, 94, per KEN-
NEDY, J. These authorities show that the learned judge com-
mitted no error in his charge.
But we think the court erred in the rejection of Thomas
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Fogarty as a witness on the ground of infamy. Fogarty had
been convicted and sentenced for embezzlement of the county's
money, as a tax-collector, under the 65th section of the Act of
31st March 1860, Brightly's Dig. 229, pl. 73; and was in prison
under his sentence. The punishment of the offence of embezzle-
ment under this section is imprisonment by separate or solitary
confinement at labor not exceeding five years, and a fine equal to
the amount of the money embezzled. The punishment is the
same in kind as that inflicted for infamous offences in Pennsylvania;
but it is now settled that it is not the nature of the punishment,
but of the offence, which determines its infamous character: 2
Russell on'Crimes 974; 1 Greenleaf Ev. § 372, in note 3; 3
Casey 465. Infamous crimes are treason, felony, and every
species of the erivren falsi, such as forgery, perjury, suborna-
tion of perjury, and offences affecting the public administration
of justice; such as bribing a witness to absent himself and not to
give evidence, and conspiracies to obstruct the administration of
justice, or falsely to accuse one of an indictable crime: 2 Russell
on Crimes 973; 1 Greenleaf's Ev. § 373. This is clearly the
limitation of the infamous crimes as understood in this state; as
may be seen in the following cases: Commonwealth v. Shaver, 3
W. & S. 342-3; Bickers .Exr. v. Fasig's Admr., 9 Casey 464-5.
And see argument of counsel in Commonwealth for use v. Ohio .
Pennsylvania B. B. Comnpany, 1 Grant 331, 2, 3, 4. There are
many offences, involving both falsehood and fraud, which are
punished as infamous crimes are usually punished in this state,
and yet are not infamous crimes, and will not exclude the offenders
as witnesses : Commonwealth v. Shaver, and Commonwealth v. Ohio
, .Pennsylvania B. B. Co., supra, 1 Greenleaf's Ev. § 373. In
Massachusetts it is held that the offences of receiving stolen goods
knowingly, and cheating by false pretences, will not render the
offenders infamous: Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metcalf 500;
Utley v. Henich, 11 Metcalf 302; and see 1 Whart. C. L. § 761.
As remarked by WOODWARD, J., in Bickers Exr. v. Pasig'sgAdmr.,
9 Casey 465, the tendency of the judicial mind is against objec-
tions to competency. Such also is the direction of legislation, to.
be seen in § 181 of the Act of 31st March 1860, Brightly's
Dig. 247, pl. 190, which gives to a convict who endures his punish-
ment, for a felony or any misdemeanor punishable with imprison-
ment at labor, the advantage of a full pardon, except as to wilful
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and corrupt perjury. Fulfilling his sentence, therefore, restores
the offender to competency as a witness. The Act of 15th April
1869, declaring that no interest or policy of law shall exclude a
party or person from being a witness in any civil proceeding,
runs in the same direction. In all these cases the objection goes
to the credibility of the witness rather than to his competency.
For the error in rejecting the witness, the judgment is reversed
and a venire de novo awarded.
United States Circuit Court. Districts of Mi souri.
STATE NATIONAL BANK v. FREEDMEN'S SAVINGS AND TRUST
COMPANY.
A certificate of deposit payable to the order of depositor on the return of the
certificate was issued by Bank A. to T. D., who could not write. The bank took
his mark on its signature book, and wrote a description of him opposite. Shortly
afterwards the certificate was stolen from T. D. and presented to Bank B. by a
stranger who gave his name as T. D. and said he could not write. Thereupon
the cashier of Bank B. endorsed the certificate to his own order with the name of
T. D. to which the stranger made his mark, and an employee of Bank B. added
his signature as "witness to mark." The cashier then endorsed the certificate
and sent it through a correspondent to Bank A., which thereupon paid it, and the
money was handed over to the stranger. Thereafter the real T. D. appeared at
Bank A., and on discovery of the forgery Bank A. paid him the amount and
brought suit against Bank B. to recover the payment on the forged endorsement.
Held, that Bank A. had a right to rely on the identification of T. D. by Bank B.
and could recover.
ON the 7th day of November 1870, Tim Dunivan deposited in
the State National Bank at Keokuk, Iowa, nine hundred dollars,
and received therefor a certificate of deposit, of which the following
is a copy:-
"$900 State National Bank, Keokuk, Nov. 7, 1870.
Tim Dunivan has deposited in this Bank Nine Hundred Dollars
current funds, payable to the order of himself hereon in like
funds on the return of this certificate.
In currency $900. [No. 4991.]
G. W. HORTON,
for Teller."
Tim Dunivan was unable to write, and therefore placed upon
the signature book of the bank his mark, the officers of the bank
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at the same time writing his description opposite the mark on the
book.
Dunivan went off on the river, and on or about the 20th of
November the certificate was stolen from him.
About the 1st of December a man presented the certificate at
the counter of the Freedmen's Savings and Trust Company, and
asked the cashier to cash it. The cashier refused, on the ground
that the person presenting it was a stranger to him, but offered to
take it for collection. To this the stranger acceded. The cashier
asked him if his name was Tim Dunivan; he replied "yes." He
then asked him if he could write his name, and receiving an
answer in the negative, the cashier himself wrote the following
endorsement: " P ay to the order of W. N. Brant, cashier. Tim
j Dunivan," the party himself making the cross-mark. The
mark was then witnessed by W. P. Brooks, .a man who did odd
jobs about the bank, as follows: "Witness to mark, W. P. Brooks,
St. Louis, Mo." Neither Mr. Brant nor Mr. Brooks was ac-
quainted with the man offering the certificate.
The certificate was then endorsed by Mr. Brant, as follows:
"Pay Bower, Barclay & Co., for collection, acct. of W. N. Brant,
Cashier," and forwarded to Bower, Barclay & Co. for collection,
by whom the certificate was- collected and the proceeds remitted
to Mr. Brant, and by him paid to the party who had left the cer-
tificate for collection. On the 22d of December, Tim Dunivan
appeared at the bank in Keokuk, and claimed that the endorse-
ment was a forgery, and that he had never received the money.
Thereupon the Keokuk bank paid him the amount and brought
this suit against the Freedmen's Saving and Trust Company to
recover the amount paid it through its correspondent.
The evidence adduced at the trial disclosed the above facts. It
further appeared that the cashier of the Keokuk bank, when the
certificate was presented from Bower, Barclay & Co., simply
looked at the back of it, and remarked that "he guessed it was
all right-the endorsers were good." No information was given
by plaintiff's officer to Bower, Barclay & Co., or to defendant, as
to the description of Tim Dunivan which had been placed upon
its books; and there was no evidence as to when the plaintiff gave
notice of the forgery, except that the cashier of defendant testified
that notice was not given him until some time after the discovery.
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Noble and Hunter, for plaintiff.
E. TV. Pattison, for defendant.-Conceding that Brooks's
attestation meant that he knew the man signing to be Tim Duni-
van, it does not follow that he knew him to be the Tim Dunivan
to whom the certificate was issued.
All the cases we have been able to find with reference to the
force of an attestation are cases where the question has arisen
upon the effect of proof of the handwriting of a dead or absent
subscribing witness.
Many of these cases go to the length of holding that where
such subscribing .witness's signature is proved, this is not only
primd facie evidence that the name signed to the instrument as
-a party is genuine, but of the identity of the party sought to be
charged if the name which is signed is his.
On the contrary there is a respectable number of cases which
hold that the identity must be proved aliunde. Of these latter
we cite Whitelock v. lusgrove, 1 Cr. & Mees. 511; _lfiddleton v.
andford, 4 Camp. 34; Parkins v. Hawkshaw, 2 Stark. 239;
lNelson v. Whtall, 1 B. & Ald. 19; and American cases, Robards
v. Tolfe, 1 Dana 155. See also 2 Philips on Evid. 505-7.
But all these were cases of actions on the instruments, and the
utmost extent to which they go is that when the attesting witness's
signature is proved identity of the party executing the instrument
with the party sought to be charged will be presumed, subject,
however, to be rebutted by showing that it was really executed
by a different person.
But it is claimed here that the mere fact that there is an attest.-
ing witness will authorize plaintiff to presume that the man sign
ing the certificate is their customer to whom they issued it, whose
mark is on their books and whose description is there too; so that
they need trouble themselves no more about it.
It may be remarked that actual identification here is impossible.
The most that Mr. Brooks could say was that he knew the man
writing to be a Tim Dunivan. See Graves v. Am. -Exch. Bank,
17 N. Y. 205.
Why should the fact that this depositor signed by a mark
change the duty of the plaintiff, or relieve it of any exercise of
care ?
It has been held that a mark is an endorsement: George v.
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Surry, Moody & M. 516 (without attestation); so the initials,
"P. W. S. :" Merchants' Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443; so the
figures, "1, 2, 8: " Brown v. Butcher8' Bank, 6 Hill 443.
Now, if these are all signatures, and the bank is bound to know
the signatures of its customer (as the authorities show: Smith v.
MAercer, 6 Taunt. 76; Stout v. Bewist, 39 Mo. 277, and many
other cases), why should it not be bound to know initials, or
figures; or a mark, as well as a name? That the former are more
easily counterfeited than the latter should increase the vigilance
of the bank issuing the certificate, but does not change the
law.
. Suppose the' deposit had been made in the usual way and a
pass-book given, and somebody had drawn a check, signed it
Tim V Dunivan, and it had been attested; would not the bank
have to bear the loss if it paid it? *Could it recover it back from
the holder of the check?
2. Conceding that Brooks's 'attestation meant that he knew the
man, it does not follow that plaintiff had a right to presume that
W. N. Brant, cashier, 'knew the man to be Tim Dunivan, or that
he guarahtied the endorsement in any way. He (Brant) had, a
right to: depend on the fact that plaintiff would know its own
customer.
We insist that there 'was negligence on the part of plaintiff-
in this-
1. It should have taken 'some pains to ascertain whether its
customer had really endorsed the certificate.
2. It should have notified defendant of the forgery promptly-
this it did not do.
Mr. Morse, in h1is'work on Banks and Banking (p. 800), ex-
presses this very succinctly *
"It is unquestionable that if the payee has, upon the strength
of the payment, released any security or abandoned or lost any
possible safeguard or protection from loss, it is too late for the
bank to undo the error at his expense."
And further he says, "Where the bank seeks to recover from
the payee it is held rigorously to make the discovery of the forgery
and to give notice of it to the holder with great promptitude."
Indeed, in such a case as this the doctrine laid down in Cocks
v. Aasterman, 8 Barn. & Cress. 92, and other cases which have
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followed it: Wilkinson v. Johnson, Id. 428; Price v. Nea4 8
Burr. 1354, and other cases, does not seem too strong.
The very mildest case involving this principle is that of Canal
Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill 292; yet there it is held that
reasonable diligence in giving notice is necessary.
TREAT, J., charged the jury as follows :-
Gentlemen of the jury :-The case you are trying turns mainly
on the question of negligence. The fact that defendant is a cor-
poration is in proof. You have then the plaintiff a corporation
and the defendant a corporation.
The rule of law usually is, that where a certificate of deposit
is issued by a bank, and it comes back to the bank issuing it with
the endorsement of the depositor through the hands of bond fide
innocent parties, the endorsement being forged, the bank paying
the deposit certificate must lose ' it ; for they are presumed to
know the signatures of their customers, and the bank issuing the
certificate has the means of verifying the signature.
This is a different case. Here was a person who could not write.
The bank gave him the certificate and took his description. The
ordinary mode, where a person signs by his mark, is to have him
identified, so that a piece of paper coming back to the Keokuk
Bank through respectable institutions, with the depositor's mark
on the back of it witnessed by another party, the bank issuing
the certificate would have the right to suppose that the bank send-
ing the certificate had so identified the man making his mark.
The witness's signature is proven. Mr. Brooks himself says he
signed it. The simple fact, then, that the paper comes back to
the bank at Keokuk with a mark witnessed by Mr. Brooks, which
means that he knew Mr. Dunivan to be the person who made that
mark, is sufficient to justify the Keokuk bank in paying the
draft.
This, gentlemen, is all there is of the matter.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
JUSTINE MEZEIK v. PATRICK 11. McGRAW.
Where a complainant in chancery amends his bill after answer filed the defend-
ant is entitled to be informed of the amendment either by notice under rules of
court or by service of process un-ler the amended bill.
MEZEIK v. McGRAW.
After such notice or service the complainant must have a decree that the
amended bill be taken pro confesso for want of an answer before lie can be entitled
to a final hearing and decree.
A statute of Mississippi enacted that any promissory note or other contract for
the payment of money executed in that state between March 1st 1862 and May 1st
1865, should be primd facie payable in Confederate notes unless it appeared other-
wise on the face of the contract. On a bill in chancery to foreclose a mortgage
given to secure such a note and a decree pro con fesso for want of an answer, there
being no proof to show the note to be payable in other money, the reference to tile
master should have been to ascertain the value of Confederate notes.
APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Adams county.
Claudius Mezeik, on tile 10th day of September, 1862, at
the city of Natchez, in the county of Adams, Miss., made his
promissory* note for $2400, payable to Patrick H. McGraw one
year from date, and on the 16th day of September, 1862, the said
Claudius Mezeik and Justine his wife executed a deed of mortgage
to Patrick H. McGraw on certain lands situate in said county of
Adams, to secure the payment of said note. In the year 1865
the said Claudius Mezeik departed this life, leaving a will by
which he gave to his said wife Justine Mezeik all his property,
real and personal, and appointed her executrix of his said will.
The said Patrick H. McGraw filed his original bill of complaint
to the October Term of the Chancery Court of said Adams county,
1867, against the said Justine Mezeik for a foreclosure of the said
"mortgage and the sale of the property therein specified for the
payment of said note and interest. The defendant appeared and
demurred to the bill for want of equity upon its face. 'Which
demurrer was overruled by the court, and the defendant then
answered the bill, setting up therein certain proceedings in the
military court at Natchez as a defence to the bill. At the Octo-
ber Term 1868 of said court, by leave thereof, the complainant
filed an amended bill, and without any legal notice thereof to the
defendant, or service of process upon her to appear and answer
the same, the court proceeded to a final hearing of the cause.
Without an answer to the said amended bill, or taking the same
pro confesso for want of an answer, the court ordered a reference
to the clerk to take and state an account of the principal and
interest on said note, and that lie report the same to the court ;
and in compliance with said order of reference, the clerk reported
that the sum of $3584.60 was due complaihailt of piincipal and
interest on said note. To the report the def dant filed her ex-
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ceptions, on the ground that the note was prii~d facie evidence
that the payment thereof was to be made in Confederate treasury
notes, and that there was no proof of the value of Confederate
treasury notes. The exceptions were overruled, the report con-
firmed, and the court decreed that the defendant pay to the corn-
, plainant the amount then found due him within thirty days, and
in default thereof that the property be sold and proceeds applied
to the payment of the money found due to the complainant.
From this decree the defendant brought the cause to this court
by writ of error.
I
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PEYTON, J.-The plaintiff in error makes several assignments
of error, of which in the present attitude of the case it is neces-
sary to notice only the second, fourth, and fifth, which are the
following:-
2d. The court erred in proceeding to make an interlocutory
order for an account, immediately after said bill was amended,
without notice to said defendant or an opportunity for her to
answer said bill as amended.
4th. The court erred in directing a reference to a commissioner
to report an account of principal and interest due complainant
upon the note and mortgage. The said note being dated 10th
September 1862, and due at twelve months, was payable primd
facie in Confederate treasury notes, whereas said order of refer-
ence, if made at all, should have been made for the value of Con-
federate money with interest.
5th. The court erred in overruling the defendant's exceptions
to the report of the commissioner, and also in confirming the
report.
By the English Chancery Practice, if the amendment of the
bill be before answer, it seems that no additional subpcena need
be served upon the defendant, but he is entitled to the full time for
answering from the when time he is served with notice after amend-
ment. If the amendment be after answer, and a further answer
be required, a subpcena must be served, but service on the de-
fendant's solicitor is sufficient: Daniel's C. P. 27. Although it
is the practice to call a bill altered an amended bill, the amend-
ment is in fact esteemed but as a continuation of the original bill,
and as forming a part of it for both the original bill and the
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amended bill form but one record, so much so that when an ori-
ginal bill is fully answered, and amendments are afterwards made
to which the defendant does not answer, the whole record may be
taken pro confesso generally, and an order to take the bill pro
confesso as to the amendments only will be irregular: 1 Daniel's
0. P. 403.
Where the complainant amends his bill after answer, if a fur-
ther answer to the bill becomes necessary, and is not waived, the
defendant must put in a further answer to the amendment, or the
complainant will be entitled to an order taking the whole bill as
amended as confessed: Trust and Fire Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 2
Paige 589, and Sedder v. Stiles, 16 Georgia 1. A rule of the
chancery practice in this state requires that whenever the com-
plainant shall file an amended bill or supplemental bill, he shall
give notice thereof in writing to the opposite party or his soli-
citor within twenty days after the same shall be filed; and no
decree pro confesso on such amended or supplemental bill shall
be taken without proofs of such notice, unless process shall have
been served upon the opposite party under the amended or sup-
plemental bill. The amendments to the original bill were of such
a character as to entitle the defendant to notice of them either
in writing or by service of process. The court below therefore
erred in proceeding to hear the cause without giving the defend-
ant an opportunity to answer the amended bill, and even had she
been notified of the amendments to the bill, it would have been
error to proceed to a final hearing of the case without having
previously taken the bill as amended as confessed, for want of
an answer: Beville v. MeIntosh, 41 Miss. 516. The Statute of
1867 provided, in all cases founded on any promissory note, open
account, or other contract for the payment of money executed in
this state after the 1st day of March 1862 and before the 1st May
1865, that fact shall be primdfacie evidence that the payment waA
to be made in Confederate treasury notes, unless the contrary
appear on the face of said contracts. In this case the complainant's
claim is founded on a promissory note executed in this state on
the 10th day of September 1862, which is primd facie payable
in Confederate treasury notes ; and as there was no rebutting or
countervailing proof to show that the note was payable in any-
thing else, the order of reference should have been for the value
of Confederate treasury notes, with interest, from the date of
